Building State Capacity from the Inside Out: Parties of Power and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia

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In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia's President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the political battle to eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland–All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

Political transitions under presidential regimes are prone to deadlock between the parliament and the executive that can stymie reform efforts and even lead to a breakdown in nascent democracies.[1] I argue that a centrist state party (an organization formed by state actors to mobilize budgetary resources to contest parliamentary elections) operating within a nonpolarized party system can serve as a mechanism to overcome parliamentary-presidential deadlock. I support this argument using data on the electoral strategies and governing success of the first three post-Communist administrations in the Russian Federation. In doing so, this study underscores how a mixed electoral system (i.e., deputies simultaneously

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elected on both party lists and in single-member districts) generates the need for an executive political party and raises the importance of issue positions for resolving deadlock.

The argument presented in this article supports the expectations of policy makers and scholars in the United States and Russia who anticipated 1999-2000 as a period of profound political change due to Boris Yeltsin's exit from the political stage.[2] Many observers hoped that Yeltsin's departure would mean an end to fundamental conflict over the structure of the political and economic systems that generated gridlock within a polarized parliament and deadlock between the executive and the legislature.[3] More than two years later, it is clear that these expectations have been borne out. Under the Putin administration, the Duma passed wide-reaching institutional and policy reforms.

Yet Yeltsin's departure did not guarantee these changes. This article argues that the differences between Putin and Yeltsin can be explained by Putin's effective use of a state party organization, Unity, within the context of transformed party system. Under Putin, the party of power serves as a coordinating mechanism to resolve executive-legislative tensions in favor of the president.[4] This change presents a puzzle observed in other transitional regimes. Why was Putin able to rely on his party of power to legislate his reform agenda while Yeltsin was stymied by legislative opposition?

The premise of the argument is that it is not only the size of the executive coalition or the discipline of state parties that explain this difference. Rather, in the context of Russia's mixed electoral system, the effectiveness of the state party as a coordinating mechanism depends on its issue positions relative to other actors, together with the level of fragmentation and polarization in the party system.[5] Yet, the analysis shows that in transition periods characterized by underinstitutionalized party organizations and the coexistence of issue-based and charismatic appeals to voters, a purely issue-based or spatial analysis of electoral competition fails. If extreme parties draw support based on charisma or patronage, moving toward the center in a polarized system could leave the organization with only a plurality of seats in parliament and few potential coalition partners to build support in the legislature. As a result, the state party will not effectively coordinate intrabranch reform efforts.

INSTITUTIONS, PARTIES OF POWER, AND STATE CAPACITY FOR REFORM IN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS

Russia's parties of power are electoral blocs organized by state actors to participate in parliamentary elections and forge national organizations for presidential elections.[6] They rely on state resources over building a party bureaucracy and depend heavily on charismatic appeals to voters to win support.[7] Table 1 summarizes the parties of power that have formed in Russia since 1993.

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Table 1
Russia's Parties of Power

Party Organization	1993 Russia's Choice	1995 Our Home Is Russia	1999 Fatherland–All Russia	1999 Unity
Origins	Kremlin	Kremlin	Regional powers	Kremlin
Date of formation	Summer 1993	1995	Fall 1998; formal creation of the bloc, August 1999	September 1999
Nominal party leaders[a]	Yegor Gaidar, First Deputy Minister	Victor Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister	Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov and former prime minister Evegenii Primakov	Sergei Shoigu, Emergencies Minister
Current status	Merged with Union of Right Forces	Merged with Unity in United Russia	Merged with Unity in United Russia	United Russia Party

a. Position at the time of party formation.

In this article, I show that there are key differences in the parties of power in terms of structure, issue appeals, and strategy that make them more or less effective as mechanisms of interbranch coordination. Table 1 shows that in the 1999 election cycle, state actors produced two parties of power from two different levels of the state structure: a central party of power, Unity; and a regional party of power, Fatherland.[8]

Since both structural and institutional factors in post-Communist Russia undermine nonstate party formation, an executive party of power provides a potential mechanism for coordination within the parliament and between the executive and legislative branches, problems endemic to Russia's institutional structure.[9] Parties of power also could provide a mechanism to reconcile the conflict between electoral and legislative incentives inherent in presidential systems and exacerbated by Russia's mixed electoral system.[10] In doing so, the party of power can reduce the number of legislative veto players, extend executive control over the legislative agenda, and diminish individual legislators' capacities to mobilize against reform.[11]

The capacity of parties of power to mobilize state resources gives them inherent advantages over other types of electoral organizations as they pursue these strategies for overcoming gridlock. In the election period, a party of power can use current resources to mobilize voters, financial supporters, and other political elites to supplement appeals to supporters on the basis of issue positions and charismatic leadership. The governing party of power also has the advantage of being able to make credible commitments of future resources. Once in the legislature, a party of power can use its resources to generate side payments in exchange for support from other deputies and translate its own plurality position into a stable pro-executive majority.

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The prevalence of deadlock within presidential regimes in transition suggests that these inherent advantages do not ensure success. Given the variation in the role of the Russian parties of power over time, the case provides an excellent opportunity to explore the conditions under which these organizations can successfully coordinate legislative support for the president's agenda.

EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF PARTIES OF POWER WITHIN A PRESIDENTIAL REGIME

In 1993, Boris Yeltsin engaged in a strategy of institutional capture and established a super-presidential constitutional structure that awarded the president extensive legislative, budgetary, and appointment powers.[12] He also built two major parties of power over two election cycles. Yet even in the face of the overwhelming power vested in the presidency and the control of state resources, Yeltsin's reform agenda was stifled by the lower house of parliament, the Duma.[13] The cause of the deadlock was a proliferation of veto players—opposition parties and legislative factions—that blocked the executive's legislative agenda.[14]

The power of opposition groups was heightened by the Duma's internal structures that incorporated both strong party and committee powers that were distributed according to party representation and therefore reflected the balance of power within the party system. While a majority coalition in the Duma could activate the centralized control of the Duma's apparatus, a fragmented or polarized party system could create an opportunity for minority actors to thwart the president's initiatives and to promote their own agendas.[15]

In contrast, President Putin has dominated the legislative process and enacted far-reaching reform legislation. This difference cannot be explained either by the size of the party of power in the legislature or by the level of internal discipline within the party organizations. Russia's legislative-based organizations were remarkably disciplined, and the size of the parliamentary contingents of Unity and Democratic Russia were remarkably similar.[16] And yet there was a large difference in the ability of these organizations to coordinate support for the president's reform agendas.

The premise of this work is that the success of the party of power is contingent on two factors: the ability of the party of power to move to the center on key political issues and the degree of polarization in the party system.[17] These factors influence the executive's capacity to overcome the disconnect in electoral incentives between Russia's president and parliamentarians. This focus on issue positions and even parties may seem odd to many analysts, particularly those who study presidential systems with plurality electoral regulations. In these systems, the capacity of the executive to win the support of district-based representatives based on pork or patronage-based side payments does not really require a party organization, much less one with compatible coalition partners. Yet in a proportional representation (PR) or mixed electoral structure, parliamentary elections yield

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national electoral blocs that compete with the president for the same voters. For these party-based deputies, compromise with the executive may damage the reputation of the national party's leader or alienate its voter base. Thus, the president cannot rely solely on state resources to forge support among national party-based representatives.

The importance of issue positions is even more important in transitions where political debate is characterized by a regime divide or a fight over the fundamental structure of state institutions that define the winners and losers.[18] In these cases, parties may be pushed to the extremes of the political space and find it extremely difficult to compromise with their opponents without undermining their voter base, elite support, or the reputations of the parties' leaders.[19]

To understand the influence of issue positions on the success of a party of power, it is important to recognize the difference in the logic of electioneering and coalition formation in transitional and developed democracies. In transition, underinstitutionalized parties garner voter support on the basis of both issue-based and charismatic appeals. Because of the multicausality of individual vote choice, even if voters are clustered in the center of the political space, extremist parties can be expected to win support disproportionate to their issue appeals. This dynamic will undermine the support for centrist party organizations, leaving them with only a plurality of seats in the legislature.

Existing leadership may also preclude a centrist strategy. In particular, revolutionary leaders may constrain the capacity of the party to move credibly toward the median voter. Yeltsin exemplifies a leader whose promarket and pro-Western issue positions limited the credibility of the centrist appeals of his administration's parties of power. This implies that an executive strategy that incorporates a party of power as a tool of elite competition may have the most success when the revolutionary actors leave the stage and generate the freedom for new leaders to define the party in the issue space. In doing so, the party of power and other actors may move to the center of the political space, paving the way for compromise over particular policy areas.

Counterintuitively, moving toward the center of the policy space in the context of party system polarization may not be an optimal strategy. A centrist position could isolate a party, leaving it few potential coalition partners once it enters government. Extremist parties may not want to cooperate with a centrist organization for fear of damaging their leaders' reputations or otherwise undermining their political bases. Under these conditions, a centrist party of power will have little success in forging a majority coalition in parliament and will not be able to neutralize extremist veto players or capture the internal legislative levers to dominate the agenda. Thus, it is the interaction between party system polarization and the issue positions of the party of power that enables it to successfully win seats in the legislature and form coalitions toward the goal of promoting the president's agenda in the legislature. These expectations are summarized in Table 2.

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Table 2
Interaction between the Issue Positions and Party of Power in Legislative Coalition Formation

Party of Power	Party System: Polarized	Party System: Not Polarized
Centrist	Expanded potential for electoral support	Expanded potential for electoral support
	Limited potential for a stable majority coalition	Potential for centrist majority coalition
Extreme	Limited electoral support	Limited electoral support
	Lack of coalition partners	Alternative coalitions possible

The top-left part of Table 2 demonstrates that even if a majority coalition can move to the center, if the party system is polarized, it may fail to build majority of legislative support for the executive's reform program. The availability of like-minded coalition partners is essential for affecting policy change in the longer term.

The argument generates a number of implications for interbranch coordination in transitional presidential regimes. First, the party of power's capacity to forge support for the executive's reform program is conditioned by the placement of the party relative to other parties in the political space. In polarized systems, compromise over key issues is dangerous for extremist parties, leaving a centrist party isolated. In contrast, when the parties are dispersed in the political space, there is room for bargaining over specific issues without discrediting the party or its leaders.[20]

If the argument makes sense, we should also see differences across the issue positions of the parties of power, when both Unity and Fatherland are freed from leadership constraints and move toward the center. Subsequently, this movement will alter the structure of the party system, generating an even distribution of parties across the political space as political actors respond to the incentives in both the electoral system and in the distribution of voters. Finally, this change in the distribution of parties in the political space should alter vote-getting capacity of all party organizations and, ultimately, shift the balance of forces within the parliament. In the postelection period, the combination of a more moderate party of power in the context of a less polarized party system should reduce the number of veto players in parliament by creating a stable coalition to assert executive control over the legislative agenda. The ultimate sign of the party of power's success is legislation reflecting the president's reform program.

The assumptions underlying this argument are consistent with the reality of the Russian case. At the point of founding elections, the Soviet legacy endowed the Russian party system with one nationally organized political party organization,

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the Communists, and an inchoate reform movement that was captured by Boris Yeltsin and his supporters and transformed into a party of power.[21] As a result, the party system was polarized around the regime divide, characterized by parties' positions on key institutional and policy variables that define both the role of the state in the economy and their positions on fundamental democratic rights that divide parties along the left-right spectrum.

These divisions are reflected in the executive-legislative conflict under Yeltsin that was exacerbated by the extreme positions taken by the rightwing government and far-left Communist opposition.[22] Likewise, polarization caused gridlock within the Duma. In a telling example, Ostrow reports that warring party factions introduced six hundred amendments to the 1995 budget and not one of them passed due to interfactional conflict.[23]

Russian public opinion studies also show evidence consistent with this logic. Public opinion data provide some support for the regime divide in the electorate.[24] Further, although public opinion studies show that Russian voters are normally distributed on the left-right issue scale, they do not always vote according to their issue positions.[25] Some exhibit nascent partisanship while voting on the basis of issue positions or the character of the party leader.[26] In 1999, public opinion polls showed that 50 percent of Unity's supporters and 46 percent of Fatherland's supporters voted for the party based on the character of the party leader.

The next section of the article supports these arguments by presenting original data on the distribution of Russian parties in the political space and the relative position of the parties of power. This analysis demonstrates that Unity's issue positions are more centrist than its predecessors and that the presence of two new organizations, Unity and Fatherland, significantly diminished the polarization of the party system. The article then examines Unity's success in increasing executive capacity to legislate reform. I provide evidence of consistent majority support for executive proposals and decreased capacity of opposition to work through the legislative apparatus to block these reforms. The final section of the article assesses the implications of Unity's success.

ISSUE POSITIONS AND PARTY SYSTEM STRUCTURE

This section examines the campaign positions of the Russian parties of power on various policy questions, with particular emphasis on Unity and Fatherland.[27] The aim is to illustrate two important changes in the Russian political system: the moderation of the new parties of power and the depolarization of the party system. These conditions create the potential for the party of power to forge stable coalitions in the postelection period.

In general, the data presented here show Unity occupied the position of the center-right while Fatherland sat on the center-left.[28] By and large, these positions put the new parties of power closer to Russia's median voter, who had always been more conservative than its national leaders.[29] In contrast, their most effective rival,

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

Figure 1. Parties' positions on the strategy of transition.
Note: Endpoints are defined as (1) imposition of free market and (10) maintenance of state control over the economy. SPS = Union of Right Forces; OHR = Our Home Is Russia; FAR = Fatherland–All Russia; KPRF = Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

the Communists, occupied a consistently extreme position on the left end of the issue scale while the transformed Yeltsin-era party of power, Right Forces, defined the extreme right.[30] Finally, the relative closeness of the Fatherland and Unity positions defines the strategic problems facing Fatherland and foreshadows its poor showing in the election. In addition, their issue positions also portend their impact on the structure of the new parliament. Figures 1, 2, and 3 figures present mean party scores based on the placements of party activists for key issues in the 1999 election.

Figure 1 reveals the distribution of parties in the political space that is consistent across issue areas. The Fatherland resides on the center-left while Unity's positions are consistently center-right. Finally, the Communists consistently define the left side of the political spectrum on the issues discussed here, often at the very extremes of the scale. The Communist Party's position limits its ability to contest national elections—and draws votes away from Fatherland, reducing its ability win elections against Unity.

Figure 2 reports responses to a question as to whether the initial property rights allocations awarded under the Yeltsin/Gaidar privatization schemes should be reconsidered and reallocated.

On this question, the Right Forces respondents were very firm: there should be no reconsideration of property rights. The Communists want full reconsideration of the current property rights regime. Figure 2 also reveals a distinction between Fatherland and Unity—one of a very few significant differences in the parties' positions. In contrast to Unity's staunch protection of current property rights dis-

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

Figure 2. Parties' positions on reconsideration of property rights.
Note: Endpoints are defined as (1) reconsider property rights distributions and (10) maintain current property rights. SPS = Union of Right Forces; OHR = Our Home Is Russia; FAR = Fatherland–All Russia; KPRF = Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

tributions, Fatherland's score suggests support for reallocation. The Unity organization, although more moderate than its predecessors, still strongly supported the preservation of current property rights regimes, an important source of side payments to party supporters.

Aside from property rights, this distribution of parties holds for other issue domains. As Figure 3 shows, the pattern extends to foreign policy issues such as Russian cooperation with international alliances, defining a significant departure from the positions of previous parties of power. As with economic issues, Unity is much less staunchly pro-Western than its predecessors, moving further to the left to challenge Fatherland's position.

In summary, these data describe Unity as a state party that is clearly right-leaning but considerably more moderate than its predecessors—a party distinct from any previously affiliated with the Yeltsin regime. In contrast, the alternative party of power, Fatherland, staked out the center-left position. These two organizations transformed the structure of the party system by placing two resource-rich organizations with strong national leadership to the center of the political space. This redefinition of the political space set the stage for a new centrist coalition in parliament that enhanced executive capacity to deliver reform legislation.

Unity's strategy also severely constrained its chief rival, Fatherland. While the Communists remained too extreme for most voters, its stable following provided a formidable challenge to Fatherland's attempt to win left-leaning voters. At the

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

Figure 3. Parties' positions on cooperation with international alliances (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).
Note: Endpoints are defined as (1) no cooperation with the West and (10) cooperation with the West. SPS = Union of Right Forces; OHR = Our Home Is Russia; FAR = Fatherland–All Russia; KPRF = Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

same time, Unity's center-right position siphoned off Fatherland's potential voters in that portion of the spectrum. Unity did not experience the same level of competition from right organizations and therefore had more potential to attract right-leaning voters.

The reader may wonder whether Yeltsin's departure can account for all of these changes. Yeltsin's exit from political life provoked the formation of the center-left organization Fatherland and then the center-right Unity. Unity was also able to use its freedom from a leader's reputation to match its strategy to the new context. These changes transformed the party system from one of extreme polarization to a relatively evenly dispersed set of parties in a single-dimensional left-right space. Ultimately, the mechanism for change was not Yelstin's decision but changes within the party system and voters' responses to the choices it presented.

THE MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEM, PRESIDENTIAL ADVANTAGES, AND UNITY'S STRATEGY

All presidents are faced with the problem of reconciling deputies' electoral incentives (the need to respond to constituency pressures) with the need to build support for the executive reform agenda. In Russia, this task is complicated by the coexistence of two types of deputies: those elected on the basis of a national con-

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stituency and those elected in districts. Therefore, to be effective, the party of power must be able to win support among both groups with a combination of strategies: successfully contesting elections, forging coalitions with like-minded party groups, or offering side payments in exchange for support.

Presidential access to state resources is an extremely effective tool for buying the loyalty of representatives elected in single-member districts, particularly independents, but less effective for gaining the support of members of nationally based party organizations.[31] Since the independents form factions once they are in parliament, they provide a source of coalition partners for the party of power. Yet even with these deputies, it is extremely unlikely that the president will have majority support in Duma since opposition parties win some of the plurality seats as well as seats in the PR race.

Opposition concentrated in the PR side of the race poses a more formidable obstacle to presidential reforms and demands a very different strategy than he or she might adopt in a straight plurality system. The PR race necessitates the formation of an executive party to contest these seats and demands a very disciplined and loyal parliamentary faction. In addition, the existence of the PR race undermines the use of side payments to build a stable legislative coalition with opposition deputies who are grounded in national constituencies rather than individual districts or around narrow interests. This strategy becomes even less likely if the opposition exists across the regime divide. Thus, a party of power will want to maximize its own contingent within the PR portion of the race while still maintaining discipline, and it will want to be able to forge ties with other like-minded party organizations.

Internally, a party of power can build discipline by removing electoral incentives for its deputies to build personal votes within the confines of the party label. First, the party of power could focus its nomination in the party list race, making deputies more dependent on the president and president's reputation than their own personal resources or narrow constituencies. In doing so, the party can undermine existing ties to strong regional governors who might be able to provide patronage or pork benefits in competition with the president. The power of regional officials can be further diminished by forming regional lists that do not coincide with federal boundaries.

A simple comparison of recruitment in single-member districts and in the structure of regional lists shown in Table 3 demonstrates that Unity differs from the other parties of power in ways that are consistent with this logic. Rather than create a long list of national notables on a central list, Unity nominated only three candidates. This strategy ensured that most of the seats won by the party in the PR race would be allocated to candidates on the regional lists rather than the Moscow-based politicians with ambitions toward the presidency or an independent base of support. In addition, while Russia's Choice, Our Home, and Fatherland formed their subnational lists based on administrative boundaries, Unity amalgamated its

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Table 3
Differences in Candidate Recruitment and Strategies among the Parties of Power

	1993 Russia's Choice	1995 Our Home Is Russia	1999 Unity	1999 Fatherland–All Russia
Candidates on the central party list	212[a]	12	3	18
Candidates on the regional party lists	—	223	191	261
Number of regional lists	—	85	26	36
Candidates in single-member districts	88	103	31	90

Source: 1993 data compiled from *Rossiskaya Gazeta;* 1995 from Central Election Commission Report at www.fci.ru; 1999 from Central Electoral Commission at www.fci.ru/gd99 and Vestnik Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii 1999-2000.
a. There is no reliable breakout of this data for 1993.

regional lists. As a result, individual candidates were less able to rely on the largess of strong governors.

Finally, Table 3 indicates that Unity also adopted a different strategy for recruiting prominent local officials to run in single-member districts.[32] On this score, both Russia's Choice and Fatherland were extremely successful in recruiting ambitious candidates while Our Home was less attractive after the demonstration of the weakness of Russia's Choice in 1993. In contrast, the Unity organization nominated far fewer district candidates, removing the conflict between electoral and legislative incentives within the party. It is almost certain that this difference is partly due to the short time afforded Unity to compile its candidate lists and district nominations. Yet the large number of candidates included on the regional party lists and the inordinately low percentage of candidates who ran in both races suggest that there is strategic element in these choices. In the Duma, Unity's deputies have been extremely disciplined, providing a significant base to build a strong pro-executive legislative coalition.

ELECTION RETURNS: THE SURPRISING RESULTS

The parties of power always seemed to be surprised by the outcome of their elections, and they are most often disappointed. Of these four blocs, only Unity managed to supersede expectations, a task made easier by the fact that most observers dismissed Unity altogether in September. Writing before the creation of Unity, Golosov argued that the constellation of forces leading up to the 1999 elections was much the same as in previous elections.[33] Not anticipating Unity's electoral strategy, he argued that the outcome would rest with the capacity of Fatherland to cement its new left-center position. It seems that no one, from politicians to scholars, anticipated the impact that the creation of a center-right governing party would have on the electoral race.

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

Figure 4. Changing popular support for political parties.
Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde (www.cspp.strath.ac.uk); Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (VCIOM) (www.wciom.ru).
Note: KPRF = Communist Party of the Russian Federation; FAR = Fatherland–All Russia; SPS = Union of Right Forces; LDPR = Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation; NDR = Our Home Is Russia.

Immediately after the entry of Unity, the political calculations of voters and elites began to change. These dramatic shifts in public opinion in the leading up to the elections are captured in Figure 4. Unity's formation in September shifted public support away from its two main rivals, the Communists and Fatherland, and from the centrist organization Yabloko. Conversely, Unity's entrance into the race bolstered support for parties friendly to the government: Right Forces, the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation (LDPR), and Our Home.[34]

The data for the last points in Figure 4 are the actual election results in the PR portion of the race. Table 4 reports the electoral showing of the parties of power over time in both races.[35]

The most prominent finding in Table 4 is the large number of seats won by Unity and Fatherland in 1999 relative to the other parties of power. The data also show that Unity is by far the most successful party of power in the PR part of the election, implying that Unity managed to secure a national political base consistent with the executive's base. The importance of this success went far beyond the parliamentary elections. First, Unity's success signaled strong support for its de facto leader, Vladimir Putin, in the upcoming presidential elections and revealed the weakness of the candidacies of Fatherland's leaders, Luzhkov and Primakov.[36] Second, Unity's success in the party-list race created strong presidential support within the segment of deputies least likely to be susceptible to side

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Table 4
Election Results of Parties of Power

	1993 Democratic Choice of Russia	1995 Our Home Is Russia	1999 Unity	1999 Fatherland–All Russia
Percentage of votes in the party-list race	15.5	10.3	23.4	13.3
Number of candidates elected on the central list	40	9	2	16
Number of candidates elected by regional lists	—	36	61	21
Number (and percentages) of candidates elected in single-member districts	36 (27.27)	10 (9.71)	9 (29.03)	31 (34.44)
Total seats in Parliament	76	55	72	66

Source: 1993 and 1995, Central Election Commission as reported in Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1997); 1999, Central Election Commission at www.fci.ru.

payments. At the aggregate level, the principal impact of the 1999 election was to significantly alter the balance of power, with the new Duma bolstering the presence of more moderate or pragmatic forces at the expense of the Communists. Table 5 reflects these changes in the relative power of ideological factions in the Duma over three elections. The table reveals that for the first time, the party of power garnered the potential to build a stable majority coalition both across party organizations and by attracting loyal independent deputies and forging ties to like-minded parties.

UNITY'S INFLUENCE AFTER THE ELECTION: SEIZING CONTROL OF THE LEGISLATURE

Following the 1999 elections, the new party of power became an important tool to solve the collective action and social choice dilemmas that plague legislatures and, moreover, to formulate solutions in favor of the new president.[37] From the first, there was little doubt that a primary mission of the Unity bloc was to create a pro-executive coalition within the Duma.

Concern over gridlock between the Duma and the executive was well founded since such conflict was omnipresent throughout the Yeltsin regime. During this period, the Duma voted no-confidence twice and attempted to impeach the president. The president initiated only 5 percent of all legislation considered by the parliament and largely made controversial decisions by decree rather than through legislation.[38] In addition, 43 percent of the bills initiated by the legislature were thwarted by presidential veto or the upper house, which was closely aligned with the Kremlin.[39] In terms of substantive reform issues, the Duma rejected key initia-

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Table 5
Postelection Distribution of Seats in the Russian Duma by Ideological Group (in percentages)

	1993	1995	1999
Left	31 (3)	40.2 (2)	29.5 (3)
Centrist	8 (2)	10.2 (1)	37.3 (4)
Right	29 (3)	25.7 (2)	7.3 (1)
Independent deputy groups	26 (4)	23.1 (3)	26.1 (3)

Source: Steven S. Smith and Thomas F. Remington, *The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 32, 143, 150.
Note: The number of party organizations in each category are given in parentheses.

tives in areas such as limited land reform, bankruptcy law, electoral reform, and privatization of state assets.

In contrast to the Yeltsin period, Unity quickly became the heart of a loyal executive following and continued to grow over time. A year after the election, Unity's faction membership had increased by 15 percent. This number is comparable to Russia's Choice at the same time. But unlike Russia's Choice, Unity's modest increase in faction size went along with significant decreases in the factions of rival organizations. Our Home's top leaders, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vladimir Rhyzkov, both elected in single-member districts, joined the Unity organization. In addition, Fatherland lost twenty-three deputies prior to the first session of the Duma, most of whom joined parliamentary factions that had no electoral organizations, Russia's Regions and People's Deputy.[40]

While most Duma factions have shown remarkable discipline in support of their party, the chief obstacle to the Yeltsin regime was the lack of support for executive initiatives. In the post-1999 Duma, a new pro-executive coalition emerged with Unity and Fatherland at its core. Remington's roll-call voting data provide important clues about coalition members' loyalties to Putin.[41] Russia's Regions, a collection of independent deputies elected from single-member districts, consistently supports presidential legislation. Even before the Unity/Fatherland merger, the Unity-led coalition of four parties, including Russia's Regions, supported the government's position more than 70 percent of the time.[42] This coalition was usually joined by Zhirinovsky's LDPR—a party that has been consistently amenable to side payments in exchange for support—which voted to support the government 79 percent of the time. The Unity faction itself was extremely loyal to the president, supporting 96 percent of his proposals.

In this regard, Unity benefited tremendously from Fatherland's success, which created a pool of centrist deputies. As Fatherland disintegrated, these deputies became potential coalition partners. With the demise of the Fatherland leadership and the clear problems within the organization, these deputies were more susceptible to executive side payments and the coattails of a popular national leader. In December 2001, Unity officially merged with Fatherland to create a single organization, Unified Russia, ratifying the postelection reality and the de facto coalition

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between the organizations' Duma factions. This merger created a super party of power—marrying the party of regional powers with the party of central power. Subsequently, the central party invested considerable effort in increasing the size of its regional apparatus and creating a significant party institution under the guidance of the presidential administration.[43]

Thus, the key difference in the role of the parties of power under Putin and Yeltsin is that Unity managed to remove individual and party-based veto players and the Duma as a whole from obstructing the executive agenda. As such, the party of power played an important role in realigning the balance of power within the state and shifted the capacity to direct policy decidedly toward the executive for the remainder of its term.

There is no doubt that the Unity-led pro-Kremlin majority in the legislature increased the potential for the executive to pass a far-reaching reform program. Putin's success with reform legislation has been remarkable, particularly in areas where Yeltsin was blocked. The press attached the modifier *unthinkable* to one institutional reform initiative after another, including protection of past presidents (January 2001), central control over the appointment of regional police administrators (July 2001), the power to remove regional governors and dissolve regional legislators (July 2000), restructuring of the upper house (March 2000), bankruptcy legislation (April 2002), aid to small business (June 2002), the new labor code (December 2001), immigration restrictions (April 2002), presidential decree of martial law (May 2002), and a host of laws designed to improve the environment for private industry. Putin also submitted legislation on alternative military service, private pension investments, land privatization, and further restructuring of the increasingly toothless upper house of parliament.

Extending Executive Control over the Parliament

Building a stable majority coalition in the Duma created the opportunity for Putin to use new strategies and tactics to consolidate his own influence in the legislature and extend that influence further in the party system. In addition to enacting a reform agenda, Unity and Putin also altered relationships between and within political party organizations toward the goal of further decreasing the number of potential veto players in the party system and removing their access to internal legislative policy-making levers.[44] These actions may have long-term implications for future elections and the durability of Unity as the party of power.

The first step in this process was for Unity to build on its electoral success to further diminish the capacity of Fatherland, Yabloko, and Right Forces deputies to act independent of the executive. This was accomplished through the negotiation of a new "package deal" allocating committee chairs, committee membership,

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and other leadership positions in the parliament. In 1993 and 1995, these deals essentially divided legislative perks among all players according to the size of their factions.[45] This decision rule transferred interfactional conflict to other Duma structures.

In contrast, the 1999 deal was overtly political. Frustrated by the lack of cooperation between natural coalition partners in the early organization of the Duma, Putin ordered Unity to negotiate a secret deal with the Communists. The deal provided for the election of Communist leader Gennady Seleznyev as speaker and the division of committee chairs between the two parties and marginalized Right Forces, Fatherland, Yabloko, and Russia's Regions, which divided only five committee positions among them. As a result of this deal, the Communists retained some influence over the Duma.[46]

Just over two years later, in April 2001, with the Unity-led coalition firmly in control of the Duma, the party of power, aided by the presidential advisor to the parliament, reversed its position and stripped the Communist opposition of committee leadership positions. These actions came just a week after President Putin reportedly berated the majority coalition for its passivity in legislative affairs and suggested the distribution of committee leadership was the purview of the majority—essentially reneging on his deal with the Communists.[47] Putin echoed this assessment when the Communist officials appealed to him to reverse the decision of the majority.[48] In addition, the Unified Russia coalition removed the Communist head of the Duma apparatus, a highly funded structure that served as central party headquarters and gave financial support for their regional party structure.

Vacant leadership positions were reallocated to loyal factions (Fatherland, Right Forces, Yabloko, and Russian Regions), increasing their access to resources and removing the Communist capacity to mount opposition from within the Duma. In response to the changes, Unity faction leader Pekhtin publicly celebrated the end of the reign of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF).[49]

The change in the distribution of leadership positions within the committee system could also provoke profound changes in the party system. The close relationship between Seleznyev and Putin put an institutional face to the long-standing conflict between the speaker and the Communist party leader Zyuganov. In the face of the new attack on his party, the party conference, led by Zyuganov, voted seventy-eight to fifteen in favor of the resignation of the Communist speaker; but Seleznyev, clearly with Putin's support,[50] declined, saying that he did not represent any single party through his position as speaker.[51]

The shift in committee and leadership also has potential implications for the Communists' capacity to mount electoral challenges to the new unified party. In 1995, the Communist Party transformed the Duma apparatus into its campaign headquarters using Duma funds to run its campaign organization. In addition, the

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committee structures also provided significant electoral resources to mount a national campaign. For example, consistent with the arguments above, the considerable pork barrel resources emanating from the Industrial Committee are now in the hands of the Russian's Regions faction, which unifies independent deputies who won seats in single-member districts. The perennially strapped Communists will suffer from the loss of these operating funds.[52] Thus, Putin's majority coalition appears to be looking forward to the next election and trying to minimize the potential of its opposition to win seats.

DURABILITY OF THE PARTY OF POWER

The lasting effects of the party of power can be measured in two ways: in terms of the durability of legislative actions and in terms of changes in the party system. Both are very difficult to assess at this stage because they rely on factors outside this analysis.

Putin's policy reforms have the potential for far-reaching changes, but first they must survive the implementation stage. Legislation is only the first step in a complicated policy process that entails overcoming additional veto players in the federal hierarchy.[53] Putin has made significant strides in institutional reforms directed at neutralizing some of these obstacles, including the reorganization of the relationship between the regions and the center and between powerful regional governors and the president. In addition, the party of power intervened with some success in regional elections to remove opposition actors and establish local constituencies.

Having expressed reservations, it is important to note two things. First, after two years, Unity continues to gain strength in the Duma while extending its national organizational reach. It has also continued to be successful in enacting executive-led policy initiatives despite a loss of popular support. A number of institutional changes passed by the Duma, including the new national law on political parties and draft legislation governing regional elections, should operate to preclude the entry of new nonstate party actors, insulating United Russia in the next election. Coupled with executive efforts to control media access as well as continued access to state funds, it seems unlikely that United Russia will fade.

It is also important to recognize that Unity's success and persistence raises an entirely new set of questions for Russia specialists and comparativists more generally. Before 1999, the central questions were, How can legislative deadlock over economic and political reform be broken? and Can the executive ever control legislative deliberations? In general, the answers to these questions left out the politics of coalition formation in light of Russia's mixed electoral system and presidential structure. Many analysts excluded the possibility of parties as coordinating mechanisms.[54] Others ignored the opportunity independent deputies present to presidents who wish to strengthen their majority coalition.[55] Finally,

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some scholars left "normal" politics out of their assessments of the regime, focusing only on the extraconstitutional or coercive aspects of the Putin regime.[56]

Today, the questions are very different. Can the party of power continue to win elections and enact its legislative program? Can it do so without becoming a Western-style mass organization or cartel party? These are important questions that provide new ground to test theories of party institutionalization and transformation. This article establishes that contemporary Russia is now a place where these questions are worth asking—and where the answers provide insight into the role of executive parties in transition and the ability of the executive to institutionalize mechanisms to support long-term political and economic transformation.

CONCLUSIONS

Russia's governing institutions, from the structure of executive-legislative relations to the internal organization of the Duma, generated the likelihood for conflict within and between national state institutions. These institutional structures also pointed to parties of power as potential mechanisms to resolve these conflicts.

Importantly, the mixed electoral system in Russia meant that winning parliamentary support in Russia demanded a strategy for neutralizing opposition among deputies elected from nationally based party constituencies and single-member districts. The parties of power were uniquely suited to this task because they had the capacity to use state resources to generate side payments to independents and other deputies elected in single-member districts while also winning support among party-list deputies. Having established a dominant coalition in the legislature, the party of power could seize control of the decentralized apparatus in the Duma. In addition, the party of power could remove opponents from committee positions that afforded them the capacity to mobilize against reform.

Yet not all parties of power could fulfill these functions. As I argue here, to be successful, the party of power needs more than control of state resources; it also needs coalition partners among other national party organizations. Therefore, the issue positions of the party of power relative to other organizations and the dispersion of parties along the political spectrum also influence its ability to coordinate support for the president's reform agenda. If the party system is polarized, and the party of power is confined to an extreme position in the political space, it is unlikely that it will be able to form a majority coalition that enables it to neutralize opponents and dominate the legislative process. In contrast, a party that is able to move toward the political center in a dispersed party system will have greater success supporting the president's reform.

The data presented in this article show that President Yeltsin's parties of power faced the first set of circumstances while Putin's party of power faced the second. The Yeltsin-era organizations were able to preclude outright opposition domina-

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tion of the legislative process, but they could not pass their own legislative initiatives or provide substantial support for the president's initiatives. The result was gridlock within the Duma and deadlock between the Duma and the Kremlin. In contrast, the party of power under Putin, Unity, was able to moderate its positions and found other like-minded party organizations as coalition partners in the Duma. The relative success of Putin's reform initiatives, together with the diminished capacity of the opposition to pursue its own agenda, stands in sharp contrast to the earlier period.

NOTES

1. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 4 (July 1997): 449-72; and Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Recent evidence suggests that the propensity toward breakdown may be overstated; see Jose Antonio Cheibub, "Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2002): 284-312.

2. Timothy J. Colton, *Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); and Michael McFaul, *Russia's 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1998).

3. Fundamental conflicts are described in Joel M. Ostrow, *Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures: A Theory of Institutional Design and Political Conflict* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000); Thomas Remington, *The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime, 1989-1999* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); and Steven S. Smith and Thomas F. Remington, *The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

4. For general arguments about the importance of political parties as coordinating mechanisms in presidential systems, see Mauro Calise, "The Italian Particracy: Beyond President and Parliament," *Political Studies Quarterly* 109, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 441-60; Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies;* and R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993).

5. Mainwaring and Shugart, *Presidentialism and Democracy;* and Shugart and Cary, *Presidents and Assemblies*.

6. These parties are largely but not exclusively organized by the executive branch, although the de facto party leader never joins the organization; see Anna Likhtenschtein, "Russian 'Parties of Power': Ruling Elites' Strategies of Party Building" (unpublished manuscript, 2002).

7. In this sense, Russia's parties of power share common characteristics with other governmental parties; see Angelo Panebianco, *Party Organizations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 113. For accounts of Russia's parties of power, see Timothy

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Colton and Michael McFaul, "Reinventing Russia's Party of Power: 'Unity' and the 1999 Duma Election," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16 (July-September 2001): 201-24; and Stephen Fish, "The Advent of Multipartism in Russia, 1993-95," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 11 (October 1995): 340-83.

8. The distinction is not particularly important in terms of charismatic appeals since Fatherland's leaders, Luzhkov and Primakov, were both popular national figures. However, the distinction between center and periphery was significant in terms of resources since Fatherland was in the precarious position of being the party of power "in waiting." Both of its popular leaders expressed interest in running for president but did not have sure access to the central state apparatus that could credibly guarantee future side payments to consolidate support for the party.

9. Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Peter Ordeshook, "Institutions and Incentives," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 2 (April 1995): 46-60; and Matthew S. Shugart, "Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Communist Europe," *Transition* 2, no. 25 (December 1996): 6-11.

10. See Ordeshook, "Institutions and Incentives"; and Shugart, "Executive-Legislative Relations."

11. The weak leadership structure of the Duma mandated that any centralization of the agenda process would occur through a majority coalition of party factions, creating incentives for the president to establish a party of power. Smith and Remington, *Politics of Institutional Choice*, 33-34.

12. For a general discussion, see Lee Metcalf, "Measuring Presidential Power," *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (2000): 660-85; and Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*. For a specific discussion of Russia's superpresidential system, see Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies," *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (1997): 523-52.

13. The propensity toward legislative-executive conflict due to the need to respond to different constituencies is at the heart of the critical literature on presidentialism. In Russia, it resides in the lack of compatible electoral incentives that might link the interests of legislative and executive actors. For this discussion, see Linz and Valenzuela, *Failure of Presidential Democracy;* Mainwaring and Shugart, "Juan Linz"; and Mainwaring and Shugart, *Presidentialism and Democracy;* Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*. For analyses of the propensity for conflict between the executive and the legislature in Russia, see Ordeshook, "Institutions and Incentives"; and Shugart, "Executive-Legislative Relations."

14. For a discussion of the institutional causes of gridlock within the State Duma under the Yeltsin administration, see Ostrow, *Comparing Legislatures;* Remington, *The Russian Parliament;* and Smith and Remington, *Politics of Institutional Choice*.

15. For a discussion of the importance of different legislative institutions in the survival and capacity of presidential regimes, see Argelina Cheibub Figueredo and Fernando Limongi, "Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil," *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 2 (January 2000): 151-70; Cheibub, "Minority Governments"; and Javier Corrales, "Presidents, Ruling Parties, and Party Rules: A Theory of the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 2 (January 2000): 127-50.

16. Remington, *The Russian Parliament;* Smith and Remington, *Politics of Institutional Choice*.

17. Shugart and Carey's *Presidents and Assemblies* and Mainwaring and Shugart's *Presidentialism and Democracy* both focus on party system polarization.

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18. For a definition of regime divide, see Anna Gryzmala-Busse, "Coalition Formation and the Regime Divide in New Democracies," *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 1 (October 2001): 85.

19. The interpretation of centrist in terms of representatives' willingness to compromise over policy is consistent with Remington's definition of centrists as pragmatists; see Thomas Remington, "Coalition Politics in the New Duma," in *Elections, Parties and the Future of Russia*, edited by Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). By definition, the presence of such deputies mitigates the regime divide.

20. Sartori shows that the number of parties should also influence the capacity of the president to bargain in support of his agenda; Giovanni Sartori, *Party and Party Systems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 282-93.

21. M. Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); and McFaul, *Unfinished Revolution*.

22. Remington's assessment of the ideology of Duma deputies confirms a high level of polarization; see Thomas Remington, "Coalition Politics in the New Duma."

23. Ostrow, *Comparing Legislatures*.

24. Timothy J. Colton, "Ideology and Russian Mass Politics," in *Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia*, edited by Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, and Sarah Oates (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999), 167-89.

25. See Jerry Hough and Susan Goodrich Lehmann, "The Mystery of Opponents of Economic Reform among the Yeltsin Voters," in Wyman, White, and Oates, *Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia*, 190-227.

26. The search for a causal model of individual vote choice has yielded conflicting evidence to date. The most comprehensive study suggests that different voters rely on different cues; see Ted Brader and Joshua A. Tucker, "The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in Russia, 1993-1996," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (January 2001): 69-83; and Colton, *Transitional Citizens*. See also William M. Reissinger, Arthur H. Miller, and Vicki L. Hesli, "Ideological Division and Party-Building Prospect in Post-Soviet Russia," in Wyman, White, and Oates, *Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia*, 136-66; Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reissinger, and Vicky L. Heslie, "Leader Popularity and Party Development in Russia," in Wyman, White, and Oates, *Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia*, 100-35; and Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1997), 209.

27. The data are derived from a series of four surveys of party elites in seventeen Russian regions conducted between February 1997 and December 1999. The survey asked respondents to judge the issue positions of their party and the other major parties in the system. On eighteen key political issues, respondents were asked to assess parties on a 10-point scale. The specifics of the questions used in this analysis are described in the text. This analysis reports results for five parties: Unity, Fatherland–All Russia (Fatherland), the Union of Right Forces (Right Forces), Our Home Is Russia (Our Home), and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (the Communists).

28. These results are similar to those found by Remington in a survey of Duma deputies; see Remington, "Coalition Politics in the New Duma."

29. Judith S. Kullberg and William Zimmerman, "Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy," *World Politics* 51, no. 3 (April 1999): 323-58.

30. Russia's Choice was included in the survey first as its successor Democratic Choice of Russia and then as Right Forces.

31. Ordeshook, "Incentives."

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32. Colton and McFaul, "Reinventing Russia's Party of Power"; and Likhtenschtein, "Parties of Power."

33. Grigory Golosov, "History Repeats Itself: How the Fatherland-All Russia Alliance Is Nothing New," *Russian Election Watch* 2 (September 1999): 14-15.

34. Ironically, the extreme nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation (LDPR) consistently supported Yeltsin. Under Putin, the LDPR voted with Unity more than any other organization.

35. These data must be viewed with a bit of caution. Although the proportional representation (PR) seat totals for these parties are relatively consistent, the 1993 and 1995 elections included significant seat bonuses to big parties as an artifact of the large number of wasted votes in the PR race, so Table 4 overstates their successes.

36. Olga Shvetsova, "Resolving the Problem of Pre-election Coordination: The Parliamentary Election as an Elite Presidential 'Primary,' " in Hesli and Reisinger, *Elections, Parties and the Future of Russia*.

37. See John Aldrich, *Why Parties?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Gary W. Cox and Matthew McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

38. Eugene Huskey, *Presidential Power in Russia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); and Remington, *The Russian Parliament*.

39. Remington, *The Russian Parliament*.

40. Julie Corwin, "Duma Opening Marred by Protest . . . As Kremlin, Communists Outmaneuver Foes," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 19 January 2000, available from http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/01/190100.asp.

41. Thomas F. Remington, "Putin and the Duma," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 17 (December 2001): 285-308.

42. This alliance was institutionalized in the Coordination Council of Four that meets frequently with the president's deputy Petr Surkov. This council consisted of Unity, Fatherland, and the two factions of independent deputies elected in single-member districts.

43. "Life of the Party," *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly* 2, no. 8, 14 March 2002.

44. Smith and Remington, *Politics of Institutional Choice*.

45. Ostrow, *Comparing Legislatures;* Remington, *The Russian Parliament;* and Smith and Remington, *Politics of Institutional Choice*.

46. The deal gave the Communists control of the committees for nation building; labor and social policy; economic policy and entrepreneurship; industry, construction, and high technology; Federation affairs and regional policy; education and science; and agrarian issues.

47. Natalya Naimysheva and Aleksei Nikolskii, "Communists Lose the Duma," *Vedomosti*, 4 April 2002.

48. Alexandr Sadchikov, "Communists Are Being Marginalized," *Izvestia*, 4 April 2002.

49. Victor Khamrayev and Gleb Cherkasov, "A Step to the Right! The Executive Branch Has Created an Ideal Parliament," *Vremya Novostei*, 4 April 2002.

50. Seleznev met with Putin before the party conference and afterwards Putin expressed his support for the speaker. See "Putin Asks Seleznev to Stay," *gazeta.ru*, 4 April 2002, available from http://www.gazeta.ru/cgi-bin/lastnews.cgi.

51. For the text from the press conference after the Communists' meeting, see "The Plenum of the TsK KPRF Decides That Seleznev Should Not Remain Speaker," *gazeta.ru*, 10 April 2002, available from http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/04/10/na1018458900.shmtl.

52. "Preparations for 2003 Duma Election Begin in Earnest," *RFE/RL Weekly Report* 2, no. 1, 9 April 2001.

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53. Beth Mitchneck, Steven L. Solnick, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Federalization," in *Fragmented Space in the Russian Federation*, edited by Blair A. Ruble, Jodi Koehn, and Nancy E. Popson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

54. J. T. Ishiyama and R. Kennedy, "Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan," *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 8 (December 2001): 1177-219; Ostrow, *Comparing Legislatures;* and Joel M. Ostrow, "Conflict-Management in Russia's Federal Institutions," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 18 (January 2002): 49-70.

55. Remington and Smith, *Politics of Institutional Choice;* and F. C. Thames, "Legislative Voting Behavior in the Russian Duma: Understanding the Effect of Mandate," *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 6 (September 2001): 869-84.

56. Peter Reddaway, "Is Putin's Power More Formal Than Real?" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 18 (March 2002): 31-40; and V. Shlapentokh, "Putin's First Year in Office: The New Regime's Uniqueness in Russian History," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 34, no. 4 (December 2001): 371-99.

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